Abstract Enormous changes have recently swept through the organization and delivery of medical care. Scholars and students of the health care system and its politics try to make sense of the shift in power to identify and allocate needed resources away from physicians and toward corporate firms. I suggest that we cannot understand managed care unless we understand its power as at least substantially due to its reliance on a claim to be better science. In this way, managed care needs to be placed within an analytic historical tradition that is concerned with how accounts of scientific objectivity become convincing and support (and are confirmed as scientific by) social and political objectives. In this way, managed care reflects what I call the technocratic wish: an appeal to objective measures to resolve contentious issues and/or clothe their resolution as scientifically logical and natural.
The exposé of power did not take a history of reason into account.
In the past few decades, scholars of health care were fascinated with the big lie. Physician power was in fact political power, not merely the natural value and effects of exercising the knowledge they had laboriously acquired. Physicians took some knowledge and transformed it into lots of unique political authority and privilege over health matters. "The dream of reason did not take power into account," opened Paul Starr's (1982: 3) emblematic exposé of how knowing a little something led to maintaining political and clinical autonomy over health care. But a funny thing happened through the 1980s from The Social Transformation of American Medicine to the Clinton White House. Starr's own embrace of a version of managed competition paralleled a national journey of breathtaking speed: from medicine understood as seeing a doctor who implemented decisions based on his or her knowledge, experience, and judgment, to a corporate organization that laid out restrictions and particular decision making and access pathways and protocols based on the measured experience of large numbers of people.
Managed Care, Ernest Amory Codman, and the Technocratic Wish
This transformation, from a medicine shaped by the needs and aspirations of numerous individual practitioners to one responding to institutional budgeting and performance assessments needed to predict and control the medical care of huge populations, can be praised or vilified. It commodifies health care as the product of competing companies, but it also provides necessary control over uncontrolled resource use. Either characterization is an exercise of enormous, and only until recently absent, power. On the way to the White House, the flip side to the fashionable exposé of medical muscling became extraordinarily relevant but far less studied. Whereas knowledge brought physicians power, power in turn often relies on a justificatory regime of knowledge. White House endorsement of the power of corporate managers to manage health care hid critical assessment of an associated bag of knowledge claims.
Science gave legitimacy to physician political authority. But now, businesses using managed care techniques ride the same translation of knowledge into political power. Asserting unique knowledge of medical needs through certain aggregate measures, assumed better able to determine what is important about medical encounters than individual doctors, justifies authority over physicians and shows the range of beneficiaries of Starr's "dream of reason."
We need to examine the important connection between being convincingly scientific and being successfully powerful in health policy. The rapid spread of managed care reflects what I call the technocratic wish. 1 510 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1. Or, "The Science Illusion, " which is the title of a paper by James Morone and myself (1995) , whose spin on his book title, The Democratic Wish (Morone 1990) , inspires this label. Our paper argues that the use and behavior of health services researchers is the critical element enabling diverse forces to cohere around the practice of managed care, that is, for this practice to seem sensible and convincing. This interpretation neatly fits the theory of Bruno Latour as to how scientific work allies and mutually transforms social interests (see Morone and Belkin 1995; Latour 1983). This wish is a particular kind of appeal of "scientificness," and is one way that the social and political attraction of something being scientific, in fact, shapes what is regarded as scientific. Seeing managed care as a knowledge claim, as an assertion that we only really know about the proper use of medical resources or the relevant aspects of a medical encounter from aggregate, generalizable data about large population experience, returns study of the new power politics of the medical marketplace to its complexity as a contested site of valid knowledge in culture.
The "reason" managed care specifically tries to offer medicine should itself be subject to scrutiny. Those studying managed care need to have greater acquaintance with work in the history of science and medicine and how an account of nature or a method for studying it acquires its compelling, authoritative, and "truthful" nature. Reason's powerful empire can best be studied if we also open up to study how contingent social roles, needs, and agendas shape the compelling success of one set of scientific claims or methods over another, and how one approach (outcomes studies, aggregated behavior) is preferred to another (individual physician judgment and experience), and what was once anathema becomes gold standard, and vice versa.
I offer a first step toward doing so. Managed care needs to be placed within a history of a close relationship between scientific justification and shifts in power, policy, and politics. In this relationship, the very believability of the scientific claim (and that it is indeed objective and scientific) often relies on the degree to which such a claim can enable and command assent for such shifts. It is a history of how democratic societies rely on an objectivity of standardized measures to broker disagreement, rather than rely on individual expert judgment. It is a history of the technocratic wish. Through this wish, otherwise difficult, if not impossible, power shifts can instead be understood as shifts to "better" knowledge, more scientific and rational practice, but where the very credibility of knowledge or practice as in fact scientific and better, is shaped by its social need, use, and source. This is in contrast to a history of scientific techniques, for example, techniques of measuring and analyzing medical practice, as a progressive, logical development whose position at the end of fruitful refinement of long-standing ideas confirms its scientific credibility and objectivity. I will frustrate this history by detailing the case of early-twentieth-century physician Ernest Amory Codman, often invoked as a precursor to current changes in medical management. I will show his quite different goals and thus offer a much more fruitful lineage of events with which to associate managed care -a history of science literature examining the appeal of objective standardized measures when it enables overcoming political and economic conflict; a history of the technocratic wish.
Along the way I distinguish two meanings of standardization: instrumental and epistemological. Although often running one into the other, these terms capture and underscore the selective and varied use of standard measures as authoritative references through which to achieve agreement about the nature of things. The varied meanings illustrate my point that debate about the organization of health care services can be seen as part of more contingent and contested struggles over what counts as valid measuring and proof. The rush to see in Codman transcentury affinity around concepts such as "standardization" and "efficiency" reveals more about our faith in these as hard scientific realities (reveals more about the technocratic wish) than their true stable meaning and purpose.
Before turning to Codman and these distinctions as to how his vocabulary about monitoring physicians differs from that on which managed care relies, I will need to expand on two points in the sections that follow. The first point I summarize is the subjectivity of objectivity and is explored in the next section. There is great variability within scientific communities as to what evidence, techniques, assumptions, and so on, count as scientific. Scientific work still needs to contend with being composed of subjective choices that are debated among scientists themselves and that result in brokered agreement for norms of objective isolation of phenomena (Pickering 1992; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Collins 1974) . Despite this subjectivity of objectivity, political institutions rely on a belief that their behavior is justified as objectively good or natural based on models of scientific law, practice, or specific knowledge. If what is scientific is, historically, clearly so fluid but so politically and economically consequential, we need to explain how a given version of scientific credibility is embraced to sustain influence and power in society.
The second point is that managed care is an example of such a claim to scientific "obviousness" and reliability, and that this claim is critical to its acceptance and power. The subsequent section explores this claim. Codman is but one small example that demonstrates the historically contingent meanings and uses of the presumed scientific objectivity of standards and measures advocated at various times to rationalize medical practice. Managed care's value and success are significantly tied to the degree that it offers an objectivity that is specifically needed to resolve current political and economic tensions around health care. This value, this social and political "fit" with what can count as objective, allows managed care to bypass the subjectivity of objectivity problem.
Politics and the History of Claims to Scientific Authority
To approach science and scientific claims as cultural resources -as conventions of argument, evidence, and authority in society at large-requires confronting the fact that great changes and disagreements in what counts as true scientific theory, methods, or beliefs are often heavily shaped by social interests, needs, and institutions. Examples are abundant and varied. Acceptance of the voltmeter as a valid measure of electricity only occurred when its use and those who used it were reconciled with a prior dignified ideal of class and social status that physicists had of themselves (Wise 1995) . Artificially created, apparatus-based experiment and isolation of phenomena vied in the seventeenth century with philosophical debate as a preferred method to obtain knowledge of nature. It succeeded not because it was obvious -indeed, it was vehemently debated -but because it responded to other social and political needs within Britain for a peaceful post-Revolutionary discourse regarding how nature worked that appeared more neutral about theologically charged issues. It conformed to and was purposefully modeled after accepted social norms of gentlemen's behavior that were associated with trust, veracity, and authority (Shapin 1994; Shapin and Schaffer 1985) . Tissue typing for transplantation seems like a straightforward laboratory sorting of differences in immunologic patterns (and thus success in transplantation) of organs. But scholarship shows its controversial nature among scientists and the importance of factors like organizational culture of different medical institutions and social interest in standardized, "blind" distribution practices, in the acceptance and use of typing methods (Hogle 1995; Lowy 1986) .
Similarly, techniques that people see as objective proof, when more carefully examined, are easily seen to be the result of a multitude of subjective choices (my subjectivity of objectivity). Health services research and the foundational practices of managed care that, as I will argue, appear to offer new scientific rigor to medicine are a perfect example of this. Measuring outcomes of medical interventions and paying for, approving, and rewarding those treatments with desirable outcomes seems obvious, straightforward, and long-delayed. But the value-laden nature of what is "desirable," the innumerable choices and disagreements as to outcome variables, interventions, and observed population definition, make the measuring of outcomes anything but straightforward. The benefits of physician "subjectivity" and the inherent limits of medical knowledge, as well as the similar subjective, value-based decisions that mark the process of outcomes research, have been explored (Tanenbaum 1993; Gifford 1996; Ashmore, Mulkay, and Pinch 1989; Gorovitz and MacIntyre 1976; Hunter 1991) .
Summarizing responses to constructed measurements in an average so as to ostensibly capture true causal inferences, is fraught with methodological constraints that complicate their easy generalizability. Statistical inference based on standard measures has identified and mobilized critical behaviors and insights to the benefit of mankind. But as just one way of fruitfully understanding and organizing nature and social life, its often dominant power needs to be explained. Transforming seemingly chance events, resistant to prediction and control, into tabulated observations interpreted to reveal not chance but fundamental traits and patterns, was a central event in modern culture. This was a transition from seeing in large, quantified descriptions of society (crime rates, tabulated heights, occupations, disease occurrence) simple descriptive information about the world, to seeing in them lawful regularities offering primary knowledge preferable to individual experience. This transition did not change culture by the sheer force of its logic. To be seen as self-evidently logical, many other things such as a liberal political project that saw an opportunity to reform, manipulate, and improve large populations was necessary. Such changes occurred, as detailed in the European stage, over the nineteenth century (Hacking 1990) . New approaches and meanings of tabulated experience confirmed and were themselves reinforced and confirmed by broader movements in political economy.
These events stand at the beginning of a possible history of the technocratic wish. Such a history is not interested in proving or disproving reality, but in investigating how and why circumstances arise such that appeals to one choice for explaining reality-standard, objective, numerical measures-come to be compelling. Especially when they previously were not compelling and supplanted a prior and different tradition, usually individual expert-based judgment, which despite its poverty of aggregate standard measures, accomplished quite a bit in terms of "real" knowledge (e.g., evolution, most causes of most diseases, and the effectiveness of important drugs come to mind).
Consider studies of the introduction of cost-benefit ratios for choosing competing public works projects (a critical entrée for cost-benefit analysis in public policy), pursuit of randomized-control trials by the Food and Drug Administration and advocacy groups as the necessary method for assessing drug efficacy, and the use of a few standard grain grades to capture what had been direct individual inspection of grain quality and diversity by purchasers. These changes were not "obviously" scientific, but acquired their obviousness in order to reliably facilitate other compelling political and economic goals. These events should be understood in the way that they respectively reduced conflict over which town got a bridge, provided a tool for consensus about regulation of pharmaceuticals, enabled groups such as Planned Parenthood to transform a controversial opinion or cause (birth control) into a measurable medical problem that could be studied, and permitted commodity (grain) trading at a location distant from the product and thus the marked expansion of that market. Without such anxieties, suspicions, or ambitions, these decisions to trust in certain kinds of numbers and their compilation would not have taken place the way they did (Meldrum 1996; Porter 1995) .
The social nature of scientific change and the subjectivity of objectivity resonate with each other and point to the technocratic wish. The former raises an obvious question: What does it mean to say that there is a social "nature" or "influence" to science? Is a scientific claim merely what people construct nature to be? There is a vast literature exploring the social nature of scientific knowledge and how norms of scientific proof change. It is diverse and wide ranging in the degree of autonomy versus social construction accorded to science, and is beyond the scope of this article (Bloor [1976 (Bloor [ ] 1991 Fleck [1935] 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Merton 1973; Popper 1972; Kuhn [1962 Kuhn [ ] 1970 Wittgenstein 1956) .
But the technocratic wish is one historical interpretation of the social aspects of scientific change that powerfully approaches these vexing questions. It is particularly compelling and underscored by events in the medical marketplace. The best way to approach these issues and not fall into a trite social constructionism is first not to lump every single scientific discovery together and feel a need to find a single explanation for their acceptance. More important, however, there appears to be a fairly comprehensive notion of the social nature of what counts as objective knowledge which does not paralyze us into accepting that there are no real phenomena out there.
There are very appealing things in requiring physicians to comply with how a population is observed to respond to different interventions. The point here is that there are many ways to prove causes and effects, to identify events or behaviors we need to worry about and see as a "problem," and many ways to compel faith in the methods to do so. The ones we choose are not exclusive possibilities and are consistent with social and cultural expectations and organization. Social and political life is seen here not as a simple producer of what is true, but as real facts of our experience whose smooth running requires certain agreed on ways of certifying what is true. Experienced reality also precludes or keeps noncompelling other possible ways of doing so.
The power of medical treatments or outcomes measures to predict and manipulate real things in the world is not being denied here. In fact, this power is what I am trying to explain. To accept such treatments or measures as compelling reveals the investment and expectation in how society is arranged to act on and respond to them. Psychometric testing, such as IQ testing, is one example of how laboratory techniques were shaped by the needs of certain large organizations (the military, school systems) to accomplish things important to them, such as selecting individuals along a range of abstracted global abilities. The summary result, the IQ, became a natural phenomenon in its own right, and not only the laboratory but the initially interested social institutions organized their behavior around this measure, reinforcing its "naturalness." IQ testing is not meaningless. It predicts much about how one may function in certain settings. It sorts persons along a dialectic fit between social needs and laboratory abstractions of nature by summing the performance of individuals based on selected variables (Danzinger 1990) .
This approach to the social construction of scientific knowledge-more a social "framing" of science (Rosenberg and Golden 1992) -makes the subjectivity of objectivity both expected and particularly illuminating. It directs us to the technocratic wish. For if objectivity can be shown at times to be made of subjective choices, what gives it definitive authority? What offers, for example, a compelling sense of reasonableness to average physician performance along a certain indicator, patient outcomes along a certain parameter, disease severity along a summed measure, and confidence in accurately identifying relevant aspects of medical practice in these ways? More specifically, how are we able to agree to hide the multitude of subjective choices in making any of those claims and agree on the objectivity of the final product?
The answer is because we often need to, so that the ways we organize our social and political life make sense, or can be sensibly changed. Agreement about objectivity sustains our basic political and economic institutions. Indeed, the authority of liberal political and market institu-tions is barely understood without considering the knowledge claims behind them, barely noticed because they are so ingrained in how we arrange our life so as to be reinforced as palpably and really true. The technocratic wish is a variant of a much broader function that scientific credibility has in sustaining these institutions.
Liberalism regularly struggled to explain how freedom would nonetheless result in an ordered society and how a free system would still permit certain constraints on liberty that could be seen as moral. A regular aspect of attempts at explanation has been a confidence in scientific paradigms and their applicability to social and political behavior (Ezrahi 1990; Albury 1983 ). Scientific claims, or at least rhetorical appeals, provide reassuring natural lawfulness that the best outcomes will emerge from laissez-faire competition on the one hand, or on the other, that learned experts can be legitimately delegated political authority to manage complex aspects of our life in a way that will be disinterested and merely technical. The simple faith that representative government remains a process openly visible and accessible to public observation is embedded in seventeenth-century arguments for the superiority of facts known by a shared, standardized form of observation -the experiment -rather than passion, philosophy, or theology.
Generalizing the success of some efforts to manipulate the natural world, models of scientific mechanism and prediction are transposed onto political behavior and offer assurance that democratic institutions will work reliably and altruistically.
Transposed into the sphere of public action, the presuppositions of representation and the idea that experts can optimalize the technical effectiveness or efficiency of public actions imply that the actions of public officials, like the actions of physicians or engineers, can be made sufficiently detachable from the subjective values of their agents to warrant trust in their integrity as functionally representative . . . The perceived historical role of experiments in the advancement of knowledge, and later machines in the industrial revolution, has socially enhanced the rhetorical power of instruments and technical operations to authorize claims not only in the context of science but also in wider areas of discourse. . . . Science and technology have fulfilled, then, a series of key functions in the ideological construction of modern liberal-democratic politics and, more particularly, in the justification of instrumental paradigms of political action. By furnishing authoritative means to define political action in instrumental impersonal public terms, science and technology facilitated a shift from early liberaldemocratic notions of public action as an aspect of involuntary "natural" regularities to notions of public action as the result of deliberate voluntary choices. (Ezrahi 1990: 45, 94 -95) The technocratic wish not only describes the expectation and hope that contentious issues in public life can be resolved by appeal to scientific measures and procedures rather than by the wise judgment of selected individuals; it more particularly appeals to measures that stand on their own as explanations. A cost-benefit ratio, a statistical inference comparing a known and a new drug, or a devised standard system for grading grain quality, are measures that assert that they contain in themselves answers as to relative value. The measure is the way to know whether something is good or bad, and in a way, that is definitive and hard to contest. This incontestability (how do you yell at a number?) is purposeful. These measures allow parties to avoid relying on the judgments of selected individuals. The histories of many measures reveal their appeal in offering closure to which all contestants will offer assent, or as a method for gaining new credibility with competitors or needed allies for political authority that avoids indicting or relying on the judgment of an individual.
Managed care relies on a similar assertion, or a wish, that standardizing medical practice through knowledge gleaned from aggregated measures, disciplined through the "logic" of the marketplace, will control costs while it maintains quality. By offering a scientific solution, it can finally crack the nut plaguing health policy for the past decades: reconciling global budgeting decisions with individual physician behavior. Only a solution understood as scientific was able to bridge this gap, and in essence, to bridge physicians' unique claim to expertise. But again, it is a scientific solution of a particular sort. The technocratic wish is not mere reliance on standardized practices. Commodification of product and specification of predictable costs and inputs are a staple of routine industrial management practices now taking over health care. Rather, with the technocratic wish, the legitimacy of applying such practices relies on the unique scientific credibility and insights offered by the standards themselves. The very measures they represent ostensibly reveal real fundamental knowledge about disease, health, and medicine.
This distinction reflects a difference between an instrumental and an epistemological standardization. Agreed on measures, such as age sixteen for driving, conventions for dimensions of industrial parts, or shared reporting formats for law enforcement or other agencies, are diverse examples of how practices (methods of data gathering) are designed to enhance and predict some control over a large range of activity and facilitate large organizations or productions. But the standards in these cases do not in themselves reveal new information. There is no inherent relationship between age sixteen and driving ability. It is a rule-of-thumb intervention to allow a population to have some control over a certain activity. This is an instrumental use of standardization.
In epistemological standardization, the efficacy of certain medical treatments, for example, or the confirmation of adequate severity of illness to justify treatment, is increasingly known or confirmed as true, based on standardized measures. For example, in mental health care, severe depression may be primarily known by a certain score on a depression symptom survey. This instrument, manifested through a summary score, is thought uniquely able and sufficient to identify and conclusively find a real, defined entity, clinical depression. This is a different way of knowing than knowing driving ability from date of birth. The latter sorts persons, but does not assert unique knowledge about them.
Epistemological and instrumental uses of standards interact and reinforce each other in a way that smoothes what were highly contested claims to authority, through comfortably predictable routines. The epistemological claims of a standard -what it says, truly, about realityand debate surrounding it can recede, and the standard then becomes habitually enforced and authoritative. Studies demonstrating chronological age as predictive of high-risk alcohol use fade as the power and convenience of a predictable regime of regulating a vast system of liquor sales and punishing its irresponsible use asserts itself and deflects reconsidered debate as to the standard's origins.
Managed care may represent such a transition from epistemological to instrumental standardization, from using standard measures as tools for more accurate knowledge about disease and treatment, to relying on such scores, protocols, and algorithms for their instrumental convenience in managing the needs of large numbers of people. Acceptance of instrumental standards often relies first on making a successful epistemological argument (e.g., "Let us sort by age because it really directly measures a true ability"). And, in turn, seemingly scientific epistemological claims about a standard are believed and gain credibility because they dovetail nicely, they are comfortably "framed," with other social forces seeking to commodify, control, and/or standardize behavior.
Managed Care as a Claim to Science
The most salient feature of managed care is its assumption of and reliance on an asserted ability to know things through generalizable, aggregate measures (Belkin 1994) . Managed care would not be possible without some convincing argument that better knowledge of what is efficacious or appropriate action in a medical, usually doctor-patient encounter, is obtained outside that encounter by individuals with no direct familiarity with the patient. Others can know better by having access to selective summary data about a patient, and it is legitimate to compare such summary data for an individual to that of a population as a way of determining the proper action for a given individual.
The swift ascendancy of this approach to medical decision making needs to be explained. To do so by saying it is obviously correct is to be naive about how other regimes of explanation became successful. But to explain it by saying it is better is a real starting point. Better demonstrates how understanding medical information some new way enables us to do things we could not do before, and thus invites a more appropriate line of questioning: What needs to be changed such that organizing ourselves and our knowledge this way was of interest?
It is and never was "obvious" that managed care is the answer to cost control in medicine. Political and economic "realities" may not havebecause they hadn't -resulted in managed care without the technocratic wish and its fulfillment. Jim Morone and I have argued elsewhere that overcoming physician authority over clinical matters and thus their control of health care dollars has been a decades-long goal. It became successful when a scientific rationale for doing so became available through picking up, and in ways transforming, the claims of health services research (Morone and Belkin 1995) . Health services research represented a reductionism long criticized in medicine, but in this way asserted scientific superiority and identification (Frankford 1994) . Managed care architect Paul Ellwood saw outcomes and other standard measures and research tools for comparing population experience as potential new "technology" capable of supplanting clinical discourse with a more precise and measurable "universal language to communicate hurting, functioning, working, interacting and living" (Ellwood 1988 (Ellwood : 1551 .
"The role of biomedical science is to generate ideas and technologies; it is the role of the evaluative sciences to provide the necessary clinical information linking treatments to outcomes" (Wennberg 1992: 67 -71) . Evaluative science could displace clinical judgment because of the lat-ter's newly recognized subjectivity. Health service research allowed replacement of "a matter of great subjectivity ('clinical judgments') to a matter of such objectivity that patient care decisions could be reviewed and affirmed or denied by individuals who did not even see the patient" (Gray 1992: 64) .
This eclipse of individual expert clinical judgments by standardized aggregate measures begs the kinds of questions I have been suggesting. How did subjectivity and objectivity get divided up and parceled along these lines with subjective doctors opposed to objective protocols, algorithms, and standardized care formats? How, even more basically, did objectivity become valued? Why did the famous practice variations of John Wennberg (1992) (where physicians in even closely related geographic areas had wide variation frequencies for performing certain medical procedures that were unexplained by patient characteristics) become a problem? Very respectable and productive medical traditions found variations natural and expected (Howell 1995) .
Health services researchers and managed care providers would argue that they became a problem when they were discovered to exist, following the gradual development of powerful objective techniques to study physician practices. But the analysis I have been developing here would tell a different story. The problematic nature of variations was not a problem discovered. Its problematic nature required many other things, in particular, a desire to predict and standardize medical practice (for example, to control costs) and a belief that one could do that in a way that was thought compelling, objective, scientific, and thus fair. These characteristics needed to be sold and would not have flourished without buyers. They were not obvious, nor do they remain uncontentious.
Hence the particular importance and relevance of efforts to portray tumultuous changes in the health care system as historically continuous normality and business as usual. Karen Davis and others in a Health Affairs essay saw managed care as part of the interest in capitated systems of care "back to the early 1900's" (Davis, Collins, and Morris 1994: 179) . A recent extensive review of managed care and its ethical and legal implications saw managed care as part of a long "prepaid" medical history from 1800s "slave owners . . . contract [ing] with panels of local physicians on a capitated basis" (Zoloth-Dorfman and Rubin 1995: 339) . Claims about the historical lineage of effectiveness and outcomes measures reach Codman's work, resurrected to become the father of the new medical marketplace. Bernard Bloom (1986) (Hill 1962; Meehl 1984; Cochrane 1971; Feinstein 1967 ).
Codman's story is not just a curiosity. Particularly because he is invoked by supporters and analyzers of changes in the medical marketplace, the easy association of Codman and others in a tradition of rigorous medical critique, gives credence to the objective, stable, scientifically accumulating nature of medical measuring. It also hides from view the more coherent history within which to place managed care -a history of the technocratic wish, of agreeing to find knowledge in certain standardized and usually quantified measures. When considered in context, the way Codman does not fit the managed care project underscores this analysis. In particular, his is more an instrumental standardization. Codman's case demonstrates the varied meanings and purposes that the idea of standardization can take.
Codman's Science, Codman's Market, Codman's Standards
It is not hard to find in Codman a fellow traveler of managed care executives and market enthusiasts. 2 In a handout entitled, Fundamental Differences in the Problem of the Management of a Manufacturing Business and That of a Charitable Hospital (c. 1915), Codman was skeptical of reducing health care to just any commodity transaction. But he clearly wanted to emulate certain tenets of business practice and logic. They resonate throughout his work, including the idea that goods be based on their value to, and sensitive to demand by, others; that products be predictably consistent, that is, by knowing the name or identification of the product one can reliably know what one is going to get; that the laborer who gets paid is capable of delivering the finished product -he is not paid for privilege or reputation enhancement. In "A Study in Hospital Efficiency," Codman approvingly saw "Insurance Companies [as] differentiating between one hospital and another, according to the actual service that can be rendered to their client," and assuring that they "conduct their affairs on the basis of actual accomplishment" (Codman 1914: 26) .
But do not presume that Codman's agenda was concerned with costs, or that the outcomes that interested him would be about efficiency or measures of the value of certain medical interventions. Codman illustrated how universalizing such terms misleads. He swam in a sea of notions about efficiency and the purpose of standardized measurement that differ from those that occupy our current attention.
Codman's work revolved around his "End Results System." This system essentially involved the completion of an index card that contained information on a patient's symptoms or presenting condition for which he or she sought relief, the doctor's diagnosis, the treatment plan, the complications of that treatment plan prior to hospital discharge, and the patient's condition one year later. Any errors in diagnosis, plan performance, or morbidity from the treatment were also classified according to certain categories such as errors in technical skill, errors due to poor equipment, and patient's refusal of treatment.
In order to characterize this work, several things need to be understood. First, Codman was concerned with hospital-based work and with hospitals as institutions. Codman was a formidable and prominent participant in efforts through the 1920s by the American College of Surgeons (ACS) to detail standards expected of hospital staffing, equipment, facilities, and practices, and which led to the creation of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. The ACS work successfully altered expectations of physician training and services in hospitals so as to move away from what ACS Director John G. Bowen described as "institutions that are boarding houses and that . . . are unworthy of the confidence and support of their communities" (Bowman 1918) . The hospital was identified as a public space and professional workshop for detailing and enacting those expectations. Physicians were expected to have certain training and available equipment, staff, and record keeping. This role of the hospital as the vehicle for the medical profession consolidated early in the twentieth century. It was where the profession laid out the possibilities of competence and excellence of its professionals and their training. This is how the hospital moved from charitable moral steward to a source of medical knowledge (Stevens 1989; Rosenberg 1987) .
The second point is that Codman's work was viewed contemporaneously and by himself as part of (if not seminal for much of ) a hospital efficiency literature. This was efficiency of a particular type for a particular purpose: for dedicated, trustworthy professionals to best maximize their brilliance and obvious gifts, and make good on the public trust and resources that they so obviously deserved.
An exploding hospital management literature reflected this. One illustration in the Boston Dispensary Quarterly (1913: 16) portrays the concept of hospital efficiency as a spoked paddle wheel churning in a literal "stream of public benevolence." The spokes of this wheel are the hospital's mission, labeled with such items as the teaching of students, the education of the public ("to cooperate with physicians"), the treatment of acute illness, and the provision of aftercare. "If any of the spokes of the paddles are lacking, much of the energy of the stream is wasted." G. Sherman Peterkin (1914) , an admiring Codman correspondent and the author of works on medical efficiency, detailed numerous "efficiencies," from the positioning of furniture to white surfaces (allowing for easy glances to check cleanliness and thus conserve physician time) aimed at enhancing the ability of physicians to concentrate easily and effortlessly on their tasks and realize their expert role to relieve humanity. S. S. Goldwater (1916) , another Codman correspondent, detailed in the pages of Modern Hospital the "efficiencies" of various organizational and administrative practices. The aim again was to offer a predictable, manageable, smooth organization of a small community to limit distractions, and mistakes, and thus enable skilled individuals to perform their best.
Efficiency was explicitly tied to endorsement of the kinds of knowledge and activities physicians claimed that they could perform and that hospitals were being fashioned to provide. In a paper by prominent Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) physicians (Washburn and Bresnahan 1915) , a Codmanesque scheme using an "End Result Card" to track patients is described that contained admission data and one-year followup. Also described were efforts to match certain surgical procedures with the practitioners who primarily specialized in them in order to improve their success. The aim of doing all this was not to minimize fiscal risk or open up MGH to consumer scrutiny, or to use such data to establish set algorithms and pathways of patient experience. For these MGH physicians, "efficient" data gathering and patient selection enhanced a science focused on physician-based emerging new technology and subspecialties. When evaluating hospital efficiency, "such an institution does its full duty only when it contributes to the common fund of what may be termed 'hospital knowledge'" (ibid.: 1). These efficiencies included the opportunity for cooperation in one location between disease subspecialists, and the advent of new technologies such as electrocardiography that required hospital resources but could provide new prognostic information for "efficient" care. The hospital was seen as a creative, newly appreciated place for new knowledge; efficiencies assisted brilliant men to realize this potential.
Standards and efficiencies were to enforce behaviors, not learn what they should be. Knowledge of success or failure, good or bad care, was not known from the measure. It was known by unquestioned, professionally based skills. Codman's data collection systems were to ensure that such skills would be performed and physicians held to them. Such standards would help purify and assure a direct connection between those skills and their receipt by patients.
A Standard Is Not a Standard, A Market Is Not a Market
Yes, Codman wished to apply standards, as did much of early-twentiethcentury medicine, particularly for the performance of surgery in hospitals. But these were to offer monopoly to a certain a priori right and good method and source of expertise. His was not a claim that certain things were better known by summarizing disparate phenomena and identifying a mean. It was not a claim to the unique powers of inference to characterize medical encounters. His standardization was more traditional: to assure compliance, to use rules or standard practices to promote certain previously preferred behavior, not to learn. It was similar to the use of standardization in large firms or organizations in order to diminish variability and enhance comparability of product or task performance, and predict and control the costs of production, method of distribution, or use of products.
Managed care found in standards new valid knowledge with which to override physician judgment. In this case, standard measures not only implement action, they are the source of relevant knowledge. For example, in mental health care, a symptom checklist score or deviation from an average frequency of visits for a given diagnosis is often treated as sufficient information that enables one to "really" know a patient's condition or needs. The score or number is primary knowledge and sufficient data to characterize what is wrong with someone or the adequacy or excess of their treatment (Belkin in press; Jayaram et al. 1996) . This epistemological use of a standard was not Codman's goal.
Implications
Hospital standardization in the early twentieth century put into effect a consensus of the medical elite as to what counted as medical expertise. Managed care is still in the midst of challenging what counts as such expertise. In this light, managed care may very well be at a transition point where the epistemological importance of standardization gives way to the instrumental. Dissent over the validity of basing knowledge claims in summations of patient experience that represent all patient experience may give way to the seemingly settled matter of that question, indeed, amnesia as to its controversial nature, and simple focus on its implementation. 3 The conflict of subjective judgment versus objective algorithms and standardized formats only appears as an opposition now. It may not remain so. Changes in practice and etiologic paradigms in medicine often require accompanying acceptance by physicians of a related, changed, social identity. If other changes in medical practice are any guide, such as the acceptance of the hospital as a standardized product, we can expect the success of managed care to rely on either a changed authority and place for physicians as the arbiters of what is scientific in medicine, or physician acceptance of it in ways that reconcile the new practices and related social identity with their unique scientific expertise.
Nineteenth-century changes in medicine have been particularly well studied to show how this happens. Scientific models and interventions in medicine had strong moral and social meanings. These meanings played a critical role, not only in solidifying certain agendas within medicine such as germ theory or the use of pharmacology such as anesthesia, but in acceptance of and enthusiasm about these developments by others. The consolidation of allopathic medical "orthodoxy," for example, was enabled, if not permitted, by a hotly debated therapeutic and moral identity of the physician that convincingly addressed various issues raised by reliance on drug treatments such as the division of labor between natural and personal intervention (Warner 1986; Pernick 1985) . The acceptance of germ theory also demonstrates how an associated social identity is critical for deeming beliefs and practices in medicine as scientifically credible. Germ theory diffused among physicians when it could be incorporated into an identity of the physician as the source of evaluation and intervention for individual patients, and where the uniqueness of patients and thus the specifically derived treatments of individual physicians and justified the doctor-patient relationship (Latour 1988) .
Newly vogue algorithms and generalized measures may be less easily digested by such a professional identity, but the tumult around these techniques reflects a battle to remake or readjust the social identity of physicians that comes with them (such as the profession's ethical selfunderstanding, training goals, and the value of its evaluative role). A flurry of writing in bioethics around managed care is one example of a discipline trying to grapple with this realignment of scientific and social identity (Belkin in press) . The success of that makeover will very much shape the scientific "advance" attributed to these techniques. Physicians may offer a convincing, socially satisfying, and fiscally realistic notion of their judgment as of primary scientific value, or may make over their identity as technicians carrying out and refining aggregate data sets and protocols, or may cede authority over what information is really scientifically important for assessing medical encounters to others.
Aside from what managed care may mean to physicians, it may have appeal to others if it is successfully allied with and understood as a needed rejection of privileged influence, much as Codman's work was. Quantification may have a bad name among many scholars. It is characterized as a tool to manipulate objectified objects and to create an illusory "natural," and too often, oppressive language of normal and abnormal (Hacking 1990) . But the frequency and enthusiasm with which it is often seized and embraced by those unempowered is less seriously considered by scholars. The metric system was aggressively advocated by radicals because basing measures in nature substantially undermined the authority of the nobility over commerce and social life (Rusnock 1995) . In health care there are many examples of often radical and persecuted advocacy groups finding respectability in identifying their cause as instead a problem of assessment and research. As I mentioned, Planned Parenthood turned contraception from a social cause into a scientific problem and medical question of how to measure fertility, thus altering its place in American politics and culture.
Statistical inference was pursued specifically for its superficiality, its measurement of broad and not individual experience, by a host of thinkers including Auguste Comte, Etienne Condillac, and Karl Pearson. It was precisely this ability to isolate more general variables and phenomena that would permit more open and egalitarian debate about social questions. Claims by elite "experience" would then lack unique authority (Porter 1995) . Those who wish to retain physician-based medicine and the ideal of a physician as individual advocate and counselor will need to answer the implications of physician discretion, particularly how it may be understood as threatening to those forces behind managed care.
But inasmuch as standards may serve these purposes, they are then implicitly socially framed and mediated values with a range of implications that can either order and enhance, but also tyrannize, aspects of our lives (Freidson 1986 ). The metric system was also opposed by rural populations that found their own power and control over their lives better secured in locally based traditions of measurement.
The technocratic wish shows the use of a specific historically contingent notion of objectivity as a tool to reach agreement on how to solve contentious problems, permit inclusion of previously excluded interests, and/or allow social or economic forms of organization to argue to themselves and others that their authority or deployment of capital is guided by objective knowledge, because they can no longer efficiently rely on, or trust, expert judgment. They then seek reassuring, or more advantageous, roots of knowledge elsewhere.
The grasp for what history often shows to be an illusory (or at least not unique) objectivity helps parcel out power in a way that justifies the resulting pattern of winners and losers as naturally "necessary." Engaging managed care means engaging, not further implying transcendent and obvious logic to claims of scientific uniqueness, which enables the new medical marketplace to move on and settle into a routine that will transform our lives. 4 Managed care may be the necessary intervention to manage and save an unwieldy and costly health care system. Making and meeting standardized expectations of health care may very well offer an excellent and consistent level of quality in a predictable and reliable fashion. My point here is that scholars and policy makers should examine how we justify and enter the routine of using these tools. Otherwise, we lose sight of the options we do have, the multiple ways of assessing, intervening in, and organizing health care, and the interests and agendas behind the particular development of the provision of health care, this time.
